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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





SAVADOR E. PACHECO, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), 
for the taking of two checks totalling $405,76 made out to 
Allstate Wholesale Distributing Company, 
DISPOSITJON IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury on December 16 
and 17, 1981 in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, 
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding. A verdict of guilty 
was returned by the jury on December 17, 1981 and on December 
22, 1981 appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
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not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment and 
sentence rendered by the trial court. 
All citations contained herein are to Utah Code 
Annotated, Replacement Volume BB (1978), unless otherwise 
indicated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 28, 1980, Mr. Charles Fultz, president of 
Allstates Distributing, a local tire company, received one 
check in the amount of $292.14 and a second check in the 
amount of $113.62 for the purchase of tires (T,8). Mr. Fultz 
placed these two checks under the handle of a cash box which 
he kept in an inner office at his business (T,8), 
Later during the same day, Mr, Fultz returned to 
the office area of his business from the rear of the warehouse 
and discovered a man later identified as the appellant standinc 
approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the area where the 
cash box was located ( T, 11) , The appe 11 ant asked Mr, Fultz 
about the possibility of obtaining employment, was told none 
was available, and left through the front door (T.12), At 
approximately 5:30 p.m. on July 28, Mr, Fultz discovered 
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that the two checks that he had placed on the cash box were 
missing (T.12). Appellant was later apprehended and found 
to have both missing checks in his pants pocket (T,19-20), 
Appellant's defense at trial was based upon his 
testimony that he obtained the checks inadvertently at 
Allstates Distributing and did not appreciate their true 
significance because of an alleged inability to understand 
the English language and American banking instruments (T,55-
56), Despite appellant's testimony and his use of an 
interpreter at trial, the State introduced evidence that 
appellant conversed in English to Mr, Fultz (T,12) and 
Detective Riedel (T.20). 
Counsel for appellant at trial vigorously submitted 
a novel theory of value of the stolen property to the trial 
judge. Counsel contended that since the checks were not 
endorsed by the owner, Mr, Fultz, at the time they were 
stolen, they had no value and, therefore, could not support 
a third degree felony charge. The trial judge rejected 
appellant's argument and found that the face amount of the 
checks was prima facie evidence of value, 
Despite the trial judge's ruling, appellant was 
subsequently permitted to introduce expert testimony from 
Ms, Mary Lou Vrabec, a Salt Lake bank employee, in support 
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of his theory. Where testifying that the checks had no 
value prior to the moment they were endorsed and negotiated, 
Ms, Vrabec admitted on cross-examination that the value of 
the checks to the owner "prior to processing" was the face 
value of the checks (T,46-50), 
Based upon the evidence presented, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty of theft, a third degree felony, 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION. 
Appellant was charged by infonnation with a third 
degree felony in violation of § 76-6-412(1) (b) (i), which 
provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable as follows: 
(b) As a felony of the third degree 
if: 
(i) The value of the property or 
services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000. 
The property stolen by appellant in the instant case was two 
checks having face amounts totalling $405.76. At the close 
of the State's case, appellant moved to amend the information 
on the grounds that the prosecution had failed to establish that 
the value of the checks was between $250.00 and $1,000.00 
(T.28). Appellant's theory was that since the checks were 
not endorsed by the payee at the time they were stolen, they 
had no value. The trial court denied appellant's motion after 
lengthy discussion with defense counsel. 
Appellant then called Mary Lou Vrabec, a local bank 
employee, who testified that the checks were of no value at the 
moment they were stolen because of the missing endorsements. 
kppellant contends that this evidence was unrebutted and, 
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therefore, the trial court was bound to grant appellant's 
motion. Respondent maintains that appellant's argument 
must fail because the face amount of the checks was prima 
facie evidence of value and provided the jury with 
evidence upon which to base their verdict. 
In People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 
113 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court stated, 
[T]he prima facie value of a check 
is its face value. First National Bank 
v. Montgomery Cotton Co., 211 Ala. 551, 
101 So. 186. This rule comports with the 
general rule that value in a theft case 
is market value, where market value is 
what a willing buyer will pay in cash to 
the true owner for the stolen item. 
Maisel v. People, 166 Colo. 161, 442 P.2d 
399. Where a check is the thing to be 
valued, the willing buyer is normally the 
drawee bank. In the overwhelming 
majority of ordinary commercial trans-
actions, the drawee bank will pay the face 
amount of the instrument, or the drawer 
will make good the instrument. E. Frans-
worth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials 
on Commercial Law, 47-54 (2d ed. 1968). 
Therefore, we hold that the face amount 
of the instrument is presumptive evidence 
of its value (citations omitted). 
The value of the thing lost is not limited 
to what the thief could realize on the 
instrument. As we pointed out above, the 
loss is measured by what the owner could 
expect to receive for the instrument. 
520 P.2d at 116-117 (emphasis added). See also: ~ 
States v. Aberico, 604 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1979). 
-6-
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The analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Marques is a logical extension of this Court's decision 
in State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), cited by 
appellant in support of his argument. In Logan, this 
Court adopted the fair market value test for assessing 
the value of property which was stolen but not destroyed. 
Applying this test to the facts of this case, it is 
apparent that the willing buyer, the drawee bank, would 
(and did) pay the willing seller, Allstates Wholesale, the 
face amount of $405.76 for the two checks. 
As was cogently pointed out by the prosecutor 
in her closing argument, prudent people do not endorse 
checks until immediately before negotiation. If appellant's 
argument were to be followed, relative impunity would be 
extended to thieves who steal unendorsed commercial paper. 
If the thief could successfully forge the endorsement and 
negotiate a check, he would net the face amount; if caught 
with only unendorsed stolen checks, he could avoid felony 
prosecution. Appellant's own witness, Ms. Vrabec, testified 
on cross-examination that the value of the checks to Allstate 
"prior to processing" was the face amount of the instruments 
(T.50). Respondent submits that the face amount of the 
checks in this case was the proper measure of value and constituted 
competent evidence upon which the jury could convict 
appellant of a third degree felony. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
A substantial amount of time at trial was 
spent in considering appellant's theory of value of the 
two checks at issue. In support of his contention that 
the checks had no value at the time they were stolen, 
appellant submitted the following proposed instruction: 
(R. 88). 
When the value of property alleged 
to have been taken by theft must be 
determined, the market value at the time 
and in the locality of the theft shall 
be the test. The value is the highest 
price, estimated in terms of money, for 
which the property would have sold in 
the open market at the time and in the 
locality, if the owner was desirous of 
selling, but under no urgent necessity 
of doing so, and if the buyer was desirous 
of buying but under no urgent necessity 
of doing so, and if the seller had a 
reasonable time within which to find a 
purchaser, and the buyer had knowledge of 
the character of the property and of the 
uses to which it might be put. 
The trial court rejected appellant's proposed 
instruction and submitted Instruction No. 22 (R.55) and 
Instruction No. 23 (R.56) to the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
You may find that a check is a writing 
which represents value to the owner. In 
determining the amount of value of a check, 
you may consider the written face value of the 
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check and the testimony of competent 
witnesses as to the value of the check. 
(emphasis added). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
When the value of property alleged 
to have been taken by Theft must be 
determined, the measure of the value is 
its fair market value at the time and place 
of the Theft. 
You are instructed that the owner of an 
article is a competent witness as to its 
value and any such expression of opinion 
may be considered by you in determining 
value. (emphasis added). 
This Court has stated that, "The trial court 
should mold the instructions to fit the facts shown, using 
language understood by lay people and blend the instructions 
to the facts disclosed by the evidence and make them as clear 
in meaning and concise as possible without requiring belabored 
legal definitions." State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 
396 P.2d 414, 416 (1964). Respondent maintains that Instruc-
tions 22 and 23 are concise and clear and adequately instruct 
the jury on appellant's argument concerning value. In 
Instruction No. 22, the alleged relevance of the testimony 
of appellant's expert witness, Ms. Vrabec, is understood by 
the language referring to the "testimony of competent 
witnesses." The fair market value theory as well as the 
important of the time the theft occurred (relevant to the 
issue of endorsements) urged by appellant are plainly stated 
-9-
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in Instruction No. 23. The trial court was not required to 
accept the precise language of appellant's proposed 
instruction. Moreover, the instructions, when read as a 
whole, adequately instructed the jury. State v. Burch, 
17 Utah 2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966). The trial court's 
rejection of appellant's proposed instruction should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 AND INSTRUCTION NO, 22 
WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
A 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
OBJECT TO THE SUBJECT INSTRUC-
TIONS BY FAILING TO RECORD HIS 
EXCEPTIONS THERETO AT TRIAL. 
In State v. Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190, 193 (Utah 1976), 
this Court approved the "standard rule" that a failure to 
object to an instruction at trial precludes the raising 
of the issue on appeal. At the stipulated time for 
exceptions to instructions, counsel for appellant lodged 
a single exception to Instruction No. 13, and failed to 
object to Instruction No. 18 or Instruction No. 22 (T.74). 
Because of the failure to enter a timely exception, appellant 
may not raise the alleged error of the instructions as an 
issue on appeal. 
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B 
EVEN IF APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE 
HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE 
INSTRUCTIONS, THE INSTRUCTIONS 
AT ISSUE WERE CORRECT AND PROPERLY 
SUBMITTED. 
Instruction No. 18 reads as follows: 
You have been instructed regarding 
the essential elements of the crime of 
theft which the State must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The State need only 
prove those essential elements. 
In other words, in the crime of Theft, 
it is not necessary for the State to prove 
and you are not to consider in your 
deliberations, whether the checks had 
any value to the person who took them 
from the owner. (R.51). 
The obvious function of Instruction No. 18 is to emphasize 
that it is the value of the stolen property to the owner 
that determines the true value. See: State v. Logan, supra. 
The soundness of this proposition is admitted by counsel for 
appellant in her colloquy with Judge Conder at trial (T.30-31). 
Appellant's citation to Section 76-6-101(4) (a), (b) and (c) 
is misdirected and has no relevance to the propriety of 
Instruction No. 18. 
Appellant's objection to Instruction No. 22 is 
equally unavailing. The language of Instruction No. 22 
merely directs the attention of the jury to the evidence 
presented by the state ("face value of the check", i.e., 
the checks themselves) and the ·evidence presented by 
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appellant ("testimony of competent witnesses," i.e., Ms. 
Vrabec). The language of the instruction hardly "distorts 
the law by weighting the testimony of the State's witness 
and giving no legal credit to the evidence that appellant 
presented." (Brief of Appellant at 11). 
The assessment of the value of the checks was 
a question of fact for the jury and Instruction No. 22 
correctly highlighted the competent evidence which could 
be considered in reaching their verdict. 
PO.INT IV 
THE COMMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING 
FINAL REBUTTAL WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL 
AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
A 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
RAISE AN OBJECTION ON APPEAL BY 
FAILING TO OBJECT AT TRIAL. 
Before appellant can object to the allegedly 
prejudicial comment of the prosecutor on appeal, he must 
have preserved his right to do so by lodging an objection 
at trial. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978). In 
White, this Court stated, 
If counsel desires to object and 
preserve his record as to such an error 
during argument, he must call it to the 
attention of the trial court so that 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if he thinks that it is necessary and 
appropriate to do so, he will have an 
opportunity to rectify any error 
or impropriety therein and obviate the 
necessity of an entire new trial. (citation 
omitted). 
Id. at 555. Accord: State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 
P.2d 1398 (1971). Appellant failed to object to the 
prosecutor's statement and, therefore, cannot raise the 
issue in this appeal. 
B 
EVEN IF APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE 
HIS RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF 
ALLEGED PREJUDICIAL COMMENT, THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REMARK WAS PROPER. 
A prosecutor has the right and a duty to analyze 
the evidence as a whole and to include any statements or 
deductions reasonably to be drawn from such evidence. 
State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975); State v. Eaton, 
569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977). The prosecutor is also given 
"wide discretion and is entitled to exercise considerable 
freedom in expressing to the jury his view of the evidence." 
State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973). 
Appellant cites the case of State v. Valdez, 
30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), in support of his 
argument concerning asserted prejudicial comment. Respondent 
concurs with the controlling test stated therein, with 
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special emphasis on the necessity that the remarks must 
call the attention of the jurors to matters which they 
would not be justified in considering. In the instant 
case, the prosecutor merely referred to the testimony 
of the state's principal witness, Mr. Charles Fultz. 
Having heard Mr. Fultz testify in the State's case in 
chief, the jury's attention was simply recalled to the 
substance of his testimony. 
Respondent maintains that the remark of Ms. 
Strachan was not so prejudicial as to constitute 
reversible error. In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
1977), cited by appellant, the prosecutor at trial stressed 
that the defendant had not taken the stand to testify on 
his own behalf and stated, "I listened to the entire defense 
in this case and never heard one shred of evidence from the 
defendant to prove any motive any reason that showed that 
Ken Goode was out to get blacks in this community." Id. 
at 1115. In condemning the prosecutor's remarks, this 
Court stated, 
Upon a fair analysis of the 
prosecutor's remarks here, the 
conclusion cannot be escaped that it 
was but a thinly disguised attempt to 
do indirectly what the prosecutor knew 
could not properly be done directly: 
that is, to comment on the fact that the 
defendant had chosen not to take the 
witness stand; and to persuade the jury 
to draw inferences as to his guilt because 
of his exercise of that constitutional 
privilege. 
569 P.2d at 1116. 
-14-
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The remarks in Eaton infringed upon a consti-
tutional right of the defendant; in this case, no such 
prejudice exists. While the transcript does not include 
the closing argument of Ms. Fletcher, it seems clear that 
Ms. Strachan's remark was in direct response to something 
contained in defense counsel's argument. The comment of 
the prosecutor was apparently spontaneous and not calculated 
to prejudice the appellant. 
If every statement by a prosecutor in closing 
argument were to be subjected to such close scrutiny, the 
legitimate right of the state to place its view of the 
evidence before the jury would be severely curtailed. The 
comment in the instant case did not improperly influence 
the jury and does not constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the finding 
of the trial court that the face amount of a check is 
prima facie evidence of its value. Such a rule would 
further sound public policy and is solidly supported by 
case law. 
Appellant's remaining claims of error are 
~ithout substance, and the failure of counsel for appellant 
to enter timely objections at trial precludes appellant 
-15-
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from raising the majority of the issues on appeal. The 
verdict of the jury should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CURTIS J. DRAKE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Ms. Ginger L. Fletcher, 
Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 
333 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of August, 1981. 
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